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S I X T H  A M E N D M E N T
Was a Lawful Permanent 
Resident Deprived of Effective 
Assistance of Counsel?
by Jessica E. Slavin
The Sixth Amendment
guarantees criminal
defendants the effective
assistance of counsel. The
defendant, a lawful alien,
has resided in the United
States for more than
forty years, never apply-
ing for citizenship. He
pled guilty to felony drug
trafficking in reliance
upon his attorney’s
advice that the plea
would have no effect on
his lawful permanent 
resident status. In reality,
the defendant’s plea 
triggers near-certain
deportation. May the
defendant withdraw the
plea on the grounds 
of ineffective assistance
of counsel?
Jessica E. Slavin is an associate
professor of legal writing at
Marquette University Law School
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In 
addition to legal writing and 
appellate advocacy, she teaches
seminars in refugee law and in law
and rhetoric. She can be reached
at jessica.slavin@marquette.edu 
or 414.288.7486.
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY
DOCKET NO. 08-651
ARGUMENT DATE: 
OCTOBER 13, 2009
FROM: SUPREME COURT OF
KENTUCKY
ISSUES
Under the Sixth Amendment’s guar-
antee of the effective assistance of
counsel, is a longtime permanent
resident defendant’s guilty plea to
drug trafficking undermined by inef-
fective assistance because his attor-
ney wrongly advised him that the
guilty plea would have no effect on
his immigration status? 
If so, can the defendant here estab-
lish the second prong of an ineffec-
tive assistance claim, prejudice?
FACTS
The petitioner, Jose Padilla, was
born in Honduras in 1950 and
arrived in the United States in the
1960s. He has resided in the United
States since that time, more than 40
years, and even serving with the
U.S. military during the Vietnam
War. Though he is a lawful perma-
nent resident of the United States,
he never applied to become a natu-
ralized citizen. 
In September 2001, Padilla was liv-
ing in California with his family and
working as a truck driver. During a
“driver paperwork safety inspec-
tion,” Kentucky authorities became
suspicious of Padilla, and subse-
quent searches and investigation
resulted in the discovery of approxi-
mately 1,033 pounds of marijuana
in Padilla’s truck. Padilla was arrest-
ed and later charged with a number
of state crimes, including felony
drug trafficking. 
After initially pleading not guilty to
all of the charges, Padilla was
released on bond, but immigration
authorities (INS) soon directed the
Commonwealth of Kentucky (the
Commonwealth) to take Padilla
back into custody for 48 hours
pending investigation of whether
Padilla “is subject to removal from
the United States.” The Hardin
County District Court seems to have
misconstrued this INS order, stating
during a subsequent bail hearing
that Padilla was “believed to be an
illegal alien.” Padilla’s counsel did
not correct the court’s misimpres-
sion about Padilla’s immigration sta-
tus, despite the fact that, as a lawful
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permanent resident of the United
States, Padilla could have been per-
mitted to stay out on bond. Instead,
bail was revoked, and Padilla
remained in jail for the year preced-
ing his guilty plea in October 2002. 
That guilty plea came about after
the Commonwealth offered Padilla a
plea agreement. This agreement
required Padilla to plead guilty to
certain misdemeanor drug charges
and to a felony marijuana trafficking
charge. In exchange, the
Commonwealth agreed to recom-
mend that the maximum term of
imprisonment on each charge be
served concurrently, for a total of 10
years, with five years served in jail
and five years on probation. 
Padilla states that during his consid-
eration of this plea offer, he asked
his attorney whether the plea would
affect his status as a lawful perma-
nent resident. His attorney reas-
sured him that he “did not have to
worry about immigration status
since he had been in the country so
long.” Padilla thereafter accepted the
plea bargain, and was sentenced. 
Padilla’s attorney’s advice about the
immigration consequences of the
plea was, unfortunately, wrong. His
guilty plea to drug trafficking, an
“aggravated felony,” means he is no
longer eligible for any immigration
benefits and has virtually no defense
to deportation from the United
States upon his release from prison.
Padilla now asserts that he would
not have pled guilty had he known
these immigration consequences. 
Prior to his scheduled release from
prison, Padilla filed in August 2004
a pro se motion for postconviction
relief on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel. In this
motion, Padilla claimed that his
attorney was required to investigate
the potential immigration conse-
quences of his plea and that his
attorney’s misadvice regarding those
consequences constituted ineffec-
tive assistance. He further argued
that he had suffered prejudice as a
result of the attorney’s ineffective
assistance, as he would have reject-
ed the plea if he had been properly
advised.
The Hardin County Circuit Court
sua sponte denied Padilla’s motion,
holding that the attorney’s advice
regarding immigration conse-
quences was collateral to the crimi-
nal proceedings and could not sup-
port a Sixth Amendment claim.
Furthermore, the court reasoned,
Padilla should have been aware of
the possibility that he might be
deported, since the INS had request-
ed his detainer during pretrial pro-
ceedings. In summary, the trial
court stated, “Padilla cannot show
ineffective assistance of counsel
merely because of a statement of
opinion on whether the Immigration
and Naturalization Service would
choose to deport Padilla given his
length of time in the United States.” 
Padilla appealed, and the Kentucky
Court of Appeals reversed. The
court noted the recent decision of
the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Fuartado v. Commonwealth, 170
S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005), holding that
defense counsel’s failure to advise a
client about immigration conse-
quences of conviction cannot sup-
port a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. That reasoning, however,
was distinguishable, according to
the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
because of the difference between
failure to advise and affirmative mis-
advice: “The record does not refute
[Padilla’s] allegation that counsel
affirmatively assured him he would
not be deported as a result of plead-
ing guilty; nor does it refute his
claim that but for counsel’s mistak-
en advice, he would not have pled
guilty.” In that context, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held
Padilla was entitled to a hearing on
his ineffective assistance claim.
The Commonwealth sought, and
was granted, discretionary review of
the Kentucky Court of Appeals’
decision, and the Kentucky
Supreme Court reversed and rein-
stated the trial court’s holding.
Acknowledging that “[a]ppellee cor-
rectly asserts that a number of juris-
dictions which have held that fail-
ure to advise of a collateral matter
is not ineffective assistance have
nevertheless held that there is an
exception for cases where the attor-
ney misadvised the defendant on
the consequences of his plea with
regard to immigration,” the court
nonetheless concluded that it made
no difference whether the attorney
failed to give advice or affirmatively
gave false advice. According to the
court, “In neither instance is the
matter required to be addressed by
counsel, and so an attorney’s failure
in that regard cannot constitute
ineffectiveness entitling a criminal
defendant to relief under Strickland
v. Washington.” 
Two justices dissented, agreeing
with Fuartado that failure to advise
about immigration consequences
was not ineffective assistance, but
arguing that affirmative misadvice is
different: “Counsel who gives erro-
neous advice to a client which influ-
ences a felony conviction is worse
than no lawyer at all.” 
After his petition for rehearing was
denied, Padilla filed and was granted
a petition for a writ of certiorari in
the United States Supreme Court.
CASE ANALYSIS
In his brief, Padilla first argues 
that, under Hill v. Lockhart, 
474 U.S. 52 (1985), and general 
principles underlying the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of 
effective assistance, the collateral-
(Continued on Page 26)
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consequences doctrine—the doctrine
that a judge’s colloquy with a defen-
dant who is pleading guilty need not
extend to collateral consequences of
the plea, but only the nature of the
plea itself—simply does not apply. In
Padilla’s view, the collateral-conse-
quences doctrine applies only in the
context of deciding whether a court
properly advised a defendant before
the defendant’s guilty plea; its reason-
ing “is not germane to the different
and much broader duties of defense
counsel in defending criminal prose-
cution.” Furthermore, “Strickland
expressly rejects such mechanical
definitions of an attorney’s duties in a
criminal representation.” 
In the alternative, Padilla asserts
that “even if this Court does not
wish to decide the fate of the collat-
eral-consequences rule generally, it
should not apply it to deportation or
to misadvice.” Deportation, Padilla
argues, “is irreversible and life-alter-
ing, and its imposition has become
more certain and less discretionary
under the successive revisions to
the immigration statutes. This Court
… should not indulge the damaging
fiction that competent counsel
would not attend to the deportation
implications” of an immigrant’s
guilty plea. Finally, at the very least,
Padilla claims, “defense counsel’s
affirmative misadvice to his client
about legal questions that the attor-
ney has not adequately researched
is objectively unreasonable by any
measure.”
The Commonwealth responds that
“[f]or a guilty plea to be voluntary
in a constitutional sense a defen-
dant need only understand the
direct consequences of his or her
plea,” a standard that is satisfied by
the trial court’s colloquy with the
defendant. According to the
Commonwealth, “the ineffective
assistance inquiry approved in Hill
seeks to ensure that a defendant
voluntarily entered his guilty plea,”
which depends only on the defen-
dant’s understanding of the direct
consequences of conviction and the
rights being waived. With regard to
the distinction between failure to
advise and affirmative misadvice,
the Commonwealth asserts that “[a]
criminal defense attorney’s act of
gratuitously offering [advice on col-
lateral matters] does not somehow
change the collateral nature of the
advice nor create a drastically new
distinction in the constitutional
analysis.” 
Finally, with regard to Padilla’s 
particular case, the Commonwealth
argues that “[e]ven if this Court
should decide to expand the 
protections granted by the Sixth
Amendment to Padilla’s situation, …
Padilla … cannot demonstrate …
that he suffered prejudice necessi-
tating reversal” under Strickland. 
In what is probably the most signifi-
cant of the numerous amicus briefs
filed in the case, the solicitor gener-
al of the United States of America
takes a middle position. First, like
the Commonwealth, the United
States’ brief argues that the guaran-
tee of effective assistance of counsel
“does not extend to providing
advice beyond the scope of the
criminal case.” In other words,
according to the solicitor general,
the collateral-consequences doc-
trine does extend to the Sixth
Amendment guarantee. However,
unlike the Commonwealth’s brief,
the solicitor general’s brief takes the
position that affirmative misadvice
may, in a proper case, be the basis
of an ineffective assistance claim:
“Although defense counsel has no
affirmative duty to advise the defen-
dant on removal and other conse-
quences that are beyond the scope
of the criminal proceeding, counsel
must ensure that if she does provide
advice on such consequences, it
falls ‘within the range of compe-
tence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.’ ”
Nevertheless, with regard to Padilla’s
particular claim, the United States’
position is that Padilla’s conviction
should be affirmed “on the ground
that petitioner cannot establish
Strickland’s second requirement—
that counsel’s errors prejudiced
him.” While acknowledging that the
Supreme Court typically declines to
pass on issues not raised below
(such as the prejudice issue in
Padilla’s case), the solicitor general
argues that “as in Hill, and in light
of the importance of the prejudice
inquiry to the analysis of misadvice
claims, a decision applying the prej-
udice standard … would provide
valuable guidance.” 
One potential response to the 
no-prejudice argument is outlined 
in the brief for the amici Asian
American Justice Center, Mexican
American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, and Other
Immigrants’ Rights Organizations in
Support of Petitioner. This amici
notes that “[w]hether immigration
law classifies a particular criminal
conviction as one that results in
detention or deportation, however,
can turn largely on the specifics 
of a non-citizen’s plea agreement,”
such as replacement of one charge
with another similar charge that
would be classified differently, or
through the specifics of a sentencing
recommendation.
SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of this case for the
approximately 12.8 million lawful
permanent residents of the United
States is highlighted in the same
amicus brief, which points out that
“[b]ecause detention and deporta-
tion tear apart families and disrupt
long-settled expectations, for many
non-citizens, the immigration con-
sequences of a particular conviction
are the most important considera-
tion” when evaluating a plea. These
consequences are even more dra-
matic, this brief asserts, when one
American Bar Association
considers the extreme breadth of
the “aggravated felony” definition
after the 1996 amendments to the
immigration law of the United
States. 
A brief filed by various associations
of criminal defense attorneys argues
that a defense counsel’s effective
assistance includes the duty to pro-
vide a noncitizen defendant with
advice about the immigration conse-
quences of his plea. In supporting
Padilla, this brief points to INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322-23 (2001),
which barred retroactive application
of legislation severely limiting relief
from deportation. St. Cyr further
“concluded that ‘[e]ven if the defen-
dant were not initially aware [of 
the amended statute], competent
defense counsel, following the
advice of numerous practice 
guides, would have advised him 
concerning [it].’ ” 
On the other hand, the amicus brief
filed on behalf of a number of states
and the National District Attorneys
Association takes the position that
the Supreme Court should rule that
deportation is a collateral conse-
quence, outside the scope of the
Sixth Amendment’s protections, in
part because “it would be unwise 
to interfere with the states’ experi-
mentation in this area.” 
Finally, practical effects on the final-
ity of criminal convictions are
raised in the solicitor general’s brief,
which asserts that, in addition to
requiring criminal defense attorneys
to give advice about legal issues
with which they may not be famil-
iar, the availability of such chal-
lenges “would undermine the finali-
ty of plea-based convictions and
could strain judicial and prosecutor-
ial resources,” especially because
defendants often may not challenge
the conviction until years later,
when they become aware of the
immigration consequences of the
plea. 
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